FHA method for VBV position control function of FADEC system based on aero-engine dynamic model  by Shuiting, Ding et al.
Procedia Engineering 17 (2011) 567 – 579
1877-7058 © 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
doi:10.1016/j.proeng.2011.10.070
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
Procedia 
Engineering 
          Procedia Engineering  00 (2011) 000–000
www.elsevier.com/locate/procedia
The 2nd International Symposium on Aircraft Airworthiness (ISAA 2011)
FHA method for VBV position control function of FADEC 
system based on aero-engine dynamic model
DING Shuitinga,b,c,d, QIU Tiana,b,c,d,*, LIU Xiaofenga,b,e, ZHANG Shuguanga,b,e
aAirworthiness Technologies Research Center, Beihang University, Beijing 100191, P.R. China
bBeijing Key Laboratory on Safety of Integrated Aircraft and Propulsion Systems, Beihang University, Beijing 100191, P.R. China
cNational Key Laboratory of Science and Technology on Aero-Engine Aero-thermodynamics, Beihang University, Beijing 100191, 
P.R. China
dSchool of Jet Propulsion, Beihang University, Beijing 100191, P.R. China
eSchool of Transportation Science and Engineering, Beihang University, Beijing 100191, P.R. China
Abstract
Traditional Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA) method is hard to identify those engine effects which lack of 
visualization. In order to solve this problem, this paper develops a model-based FHA method for Variable Bleed 
Valve (VBV) position control function, performs two groups of simulations by using aero-engine dynamic model, 
and introduces an exemplary FHA for VBV position control function based upon simulation results. The application 
of this method shows that it is feasible and effective.
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of Airworthiness 
Technologies Research Center NLAA, and Beijing Key Laboratory on Safety of Integrated Aircraft and 
Propulsion Systems, China
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1. Introduction
Full Authority Digital Engine Control (FADEC) system directly affects the working conditions of 
aircraft engines, is a critical system for engine safety [1]. Therefore, FADEC system safety analysis and 
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design techniques are hot topics in the aero-engine control field [1-6]. 
Researchers have studied the Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA) application in the engine controller 
[2], aircraft bleed air system [7], aircraft brake system [8], aircraft hydraulic and power systems [9], A109 
helicopter power system [10], aircraft system[11-12], aircraft landing gear software [11], ACE missile 
system [11], etc. Traditional FHA methods which used in these cases are empirical. But as will be 
discussed further below, FHA for Variable Bleed Valve (VBV) position control function failure is hard to 
perform that way.
Nomenclature
EGT Exhaust gas temperature
EGTlimit Limit value of exhaust gas temperature
N1 Low speed rotor speed
N1limit Limit value of low speed rotor speed
N1r Low speed rotor corrected speed
N1rg Expected value of low speed rotor corrected speed
N2 High speed rotor speed
N2limit Limit value of high speed rotor speed
N2r High speed rotor corrected speed
Ps3 High pressure compressor outlet static pressure
PVBV VBV position
T2 Fan inlet temperature
T25 High pressure compressor inlet temperature
T4 High pressure turbine inlet temperature
Wf Fuel mass flow rate
The compressors of aero-engine are designed for design point, which highlights the cruise flight phase 
performance. When engine operating state is deviate from design state, the compressors need systems that 
keep the airflow within the limits and prevent stall and surge [13]. To ensure this, one of the effective 
ways is introduce VBV system, which had been widely used in modern high bypass turbofan engine and 
mostly located at the exit of the booster. For VBV trade energy utilization efficiency for booster surge 
margin, VBV position control function influences both engine performance and engine safety. Therefore,
this function should reflect balance between engine performance and safety. If VBV position control
function performed incorrectly, it will impact on both engine performance and engine safety. Nevertheless, 
VBV position control function should satisfy the lowest safety requirements wrote in FAR33. For this 
reason, the method used in this paper which only studies the safety factor is reasonable.
Aero-engine failure mechanism is very complex in transient process, which makes safety analysis of 
aero-engine is hard to accomplish. VBV position control function failure would influence the whole 
engine by the engine re-match process, which controlled by the engine non-linear equations. Experiences, 
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it seems, are not enough to analyze impacts of VBV position control function failure on engine. To solve 
this problem, this paper develops a VBV position control functional hazard assessment method based on 
aero-engine dynamic model, as a complement for traditional experience-based methods. As discussed 
below, the aero-engine dynamic model could detects complex engine effects of the VBV position control
function failure and provides visual information for FHA of VBV position control function.
2. Safety requirements
Safety requirements from airworthiness regulations are inputs of FHA. Safety requirements for 
turbofan engine control system from FAR 33 can be collected into Table 1. VBV position control function 
failure hazard level classification should be based on Table 1.
3. Tool and data requirements of FHA for VBV position control function
According to FHA table format in SAE ARP 4761[17], we rebuild engine control system FHA table 
format which is shown in Table 2. For VBV position control function hazard assessment, ‘Function’
column of Table 2 should fill with ‘VBV position control’. ‘Failure condition’ column should traverse 
every VBV function failure conditions which are shown in Fig. 1 row by row. For every failure condition, 
‘Phase’ column should traverse every operation phases row by row. For every operation phases of VBV 
function failure conditions, ‘Engine effects’ column should fill with engine effects. Every engine effect 
should be classified according to safety requirements (Table 1.), meanwhile the classification should filled 
in ‘Classification’ column, reference materials and verify methods should be filled in ‘Reference 
to/Supporting material’ and ‘Verification’ columns subsequently.
Little effort is saved in the analysis of engine effect, viz. the analysis of ‘Engine effects’ column for 
each row of Table 2. To accomplish this, as discussed in introduction, specific tool and data are necessary.
3.1. Tools requirements analysis
Aero-engine is a complex aero-thermodynamics system controlled by the engine non-linear equations. 
Any VBV position control output exception has an impact on engine working condition caused by the 
engine re-matching. Aero-engine aero-thermodynamics dynamic model is a powerful tool which could 
find operates point rapidly. Therefore, in order to evaluate the impact of VBV position control output on 
engine working condition, an aero-engine dynamic model is necessary.
3.2. Data requirements analysis
Output of VBV position control affects engine working condition which interacts with engine parts 
performance. In order to evaluate engine working condition under different VBV position control output, 
maps of each part are necessary. In the stage of concept design, parts design have not started yet, no 
accuracy part maps are available. But the maps of similar configuration parts could reflect main character 
of these parts. FHA should focus on the trend of function failure influence on engine working condition, 
rather than the accurate values. Therefore, similar configuration parts maps are enough and required 
consequently. Besides, we could not expect simulation resolve every problem in FHA, so experiential 
knowledge is needed as well.
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Table 1. Safety requirements for engine control system from FAR 33 [14-16]
Hazard level Engine effects Probability range
Hazardous
(1) Non-containment of high-energy debris;
(2) Concentration of toxic products in the engine bleed air intended for the cabin 
sufficient to incapacitate crew or passengers;
(3) Significant thrust in the opposite direction to that commanded by the pilot;
(4) Uncontrolled fire;
(5) Failure of the engine mount system leading to inadvertent engine separation;
(6) Complete inability to shut the engine down.
10-7~10-9 per engine 
flight hour
Major
(1) Controlled fires (that is, those fires brought under control by shutting down the 
engine or by on-board extinguishing systems);
(2) Case burnthrough when it can be shown that there is no propagation to 
hazardous engine effects;
(3) Release of low-energy debris when applicants can show that the release does 
not progress to a hazardous engine effect;
(4) Vibration levels that result in crew discomfort;
(5) Concentration of toxic products in the engine bleed air for the cabin sufficient 
to degrade crew performance;
(6) Thrust in the opposite direction to that commanded by the pilot, below the 
level defined as a hazardous engine effect;
(7) Generation of thrust greater than maximum rated thrust;
(8) Loss of engine support loadpath integrity without actual engine separation;
(9) Significant uncontrollable thrust oscillation;
(10) Loss of thrust control (LOTC);
(11) An effect whose severity falls between minor and hazardous engine effects.
10-5~10-7 per engine 
flight hour
Minor1
An engine failure in which the only consequence is partial or complete loss of 
thrust or power (and associated engine services) from the engine will be regarded 
as a minor engine effect.
—
Table 2. FHA table format
Function Failure condition Phase Engine effects Classification
Reference to \
Supporting material
Verification
1 ‘Minor engine effect’ was defined in FAR 33.75 [14-15] but unexpected engine shutdown caused by engine control system is one 
kind of LOTC. This paper only focuses on VBV control function, a function of engine control system, so ‘minor engine effect’ 
definition in Table 1 is for reference only.
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Fig. 1. VBV position control function failure conditions
4. Turbofan dynamic model
4.1. Outline
The turbofan dynamic model consists of the static elements: Inlet, Fan, Booster, VBV, High pressure 
compressor (HPC), Combustor, High pressure turbine (HPT), Low pressure turbine (LPT), Bypass, main
and bypass Nozzle, which are modeled as lumped parameter thermodynamic systems, represented by 
performance maps, constant coefficients, and thermo and aero-dynamic relationships and the dynamic 
elements which include the following: Low speed rotor and High speed rotor. In this model, the rotor 
dynamics (for the high speed and low speed rotors) is represented by the equation of conservation of 
angular momentum. Fig. 2 shows the model structure.
4.2. Engine fuel control loop
The engine fuel control loop used in simulations is shown in Fig. 3. Where
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Fig. 3. Engine fuel control loop
4.3. VBV position control loop
The VBV position control loop used in simulations is shown in Fig. 4. The position of VBV is 
controlled by N2r, during the analysis we don’t separate the accelerating procedure and decelerating 
procedure and use a common plan of VBV position control. 
5. Simulations
5.1. Control plans for simulate VBV position control function failure
VBV position control function failure conditions are shown in Fig. 1. VBV position control function 
failure is considered by changing VBV position control plans, which are illustrated in Table 3, while 
simulations.
5.2. Simulation inputs & results
This paper performed two groups of simulations called simulation 1 and simulation 2 which represent 
typical acceleration and deceleration respectively. Inputs of these simulations are illustrated in Table 4.
Main results of these simulations are shown in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 respectively. For the sake of clarity, data 
points displayed in these figures were diluted, but the curves haven’t been simplified.
 
 
 
Engine )2( rVBVVBV NfP =
 
T25 
N2 
N2r 
N2 
T25 
Fig. 4. VBV position control loop
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Table 3. Corresponded VBV position control plans for simulate VBV position control function failure
VBV position control function 
failure conditions
Corresponded VBV position control plans
Larger than normal
Amplified by multiply a fixed scale factor (scale factor is 1.2), maximum value is 100%,
shown in Fig. 5(a); or
Always open, shown in Fig. 5(b).
Smaller than normal
Shrunk by multiply a fixed scale factor (scale factor is 0.8), shown in Fig. 5(c) ; or
Always closed, shown in Fig. 5(d).
Shake
Normal VBV position multiplied by random scale factors, which ordered uniformity distribute
U(0.5,1.5), maximum value is 100%, random scale factors used in simulations are shown in 
Fig. 5(e). Changing control plan are shown in Fig. 5(f).
Table 4. Inputs of simulations
Simulation 1 Simulation 2
Environment
International Standard Atmosphere (ISA)
Sea level
Static
ISA
Sea level
Static
Process property Acceleration Deceleration
Initial condition Steady at 58.1% N1r Steady at 100% N1r
Manipulate record
N1rg=58.1% Time =0s
N1rg=100% 0s<Time≤15s
N1rg=100% Time=0s
N1rg=58.1% 0s<Time≤15s
Simulate time step length 0.001s 0.001s
6. Analysis
FHA is performed in the stage of concept design, which characteristic by no design details are 
available. As data we used in simulations are not absolutely accurate, therefore, changing trend of 
simulate results of different failure conditions are more important than numerical value itself.
6.1. Engine effects of ‘larger than normal’ function failure analysis
6.1.1. Accelerate process
As we can see in Fig. 6, during accelerate process, for ‘larger than normal’ failure condition, operate 
parameters are almost the same with normal condition. But for ‘always open’ failure condition, except for 
booster surge margin is increasing significantly, N1r, thrust, T4, fan surge margin and HPC surge margin
are decrease at the same time. Decrease range is especially large for thrust (about 5%).
Reasons of parameters decreased decrease are identical. And the reason is that N2limit control loop was 
active. If VBV always open, extra energy lose is introduced which is unnecessarily in most operate 
phases especially when rotating speed is high. This part of energy lose is counted on low speed rotor, so 
the rotating speed difference between high and low speed rotor is increasing, as a result, N2 is larger than 
N2limit when N1r is 100% in that environment, therefore, N2limit control loop determines the N1r.
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Fig. 5. Control plans for simulate VBV position control function failure
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Fig. 6. Results of simulation 1
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Fig. 8. N2 curves under various VBV position control function failure conditions (extract from results of simulation 1)
N2 curves are shown in Fig. 8, as we can see in the VBV failure condition of ‘always open’, after N2
surpasses N2limit for about 1.8 seconds, N2 steady at N2limit. Meanwhile, as Fig. 6(a) illustrates, under 
VBV ‘always open’ failure condition, the N1r is 97.4%. Under other VBV failure conditions, N2 is lower 
than N2limit at 9s.
Therefore, the ‘Larger than normal’ function failure condition could result in those unexpected engine 
effects below:
• Loss of thrust control (LOTC), in the real system whether LOTC happens depends on the real system 
characteristic;
• The stable working margin of fan and HPC is decreasing;
• N2 has surpassed N2limit shortly.
6.1.2. Decelerate process
As we can see in Fig. 7, during the decelerate process, for ‘larger than normal’ and ‘always open’
failure conditions, booster surge margin is increasing and it’s a safe effect. Besides, the impact on N1r,
thrust, T4, fan surge margin and HPC surge margin are not significant.
6.2. Engine effects of ‘smaller than normal’ function failure analysis
6.2.1. Accelerate process
As we can see in Fig. 6, during accelerate process, for ‘smaller than normal’ and ‘always closed’
failure conditions, N1r, thrust, T4, fan surge margin and HPC surge margin are almost the same with 
normal condition. But the impact on booster surge margin is large (9% lower than normal condition 
maximum), under the failure condition of ‘always closed’.
Therefore, the ‘smaller than normal’ function failure condition could result in the stable working 
margin of booster decrease. 
6.2.2. Decelerate process
Same as the accelerate process, it’s unnecessary to go into details.
6.3. Engine effects of ‘shake’ function failure analysis
As we can see in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7, ‘shake’ failure conditions in simulation 1 and simulation 2 don’t 
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have significant impact on N1r, trust, T4, fan surge margin and HPC surge margin, but they do have 
impact on booster surge margin: it shakes corresponding to VBV position and the amplitude depends on 
shake amplitude of VBV position.
Obviously, for real system, VBV position shakes could result in every engine effect happened in
‘larger than normal’ and ‘smaller than normal’ function failure, even more. In simulation 1 and simulation
2 no special hazard were found. The diversity of shake modes makes that the simulation results shown in 
this paper are for reference only.
6.4. FHA output table 
According to the safety requirements shown in Table 1 and FHA table format (Table 2), considering
the simulation results we have, we could conclude Table 5 with less experience. In order to underline the 
main purpose of this paper, last two columns of Table 2 are omitted in Table5.
Table 5. Output table of FHA for VBV position control function
Function
Failure 
condition
Phase Engine effects Classification
VBV 
position 
control
Larger than 
normal
Acceleration
At the end of acceleration, VBV position is larger could result in thrust 
lose significantly, fan and HPC stable working margin decrease 
lightly, N2 exceed N2limit shortly. Whether it could result in LOTC 
depends on real system characteristic, should research again.
Minor to 
Major
VBV 
position 
control
Larger than 
normal
Deceleration Don’t have safety influence on engine almost.
No safety 
influence
VBV 
position 
control
Smaller
than normal
Acceleration
Deceleration
In both acceleration and deceleration processes, VBV position is 
smaller could result in booster surge margin decrease significantly, 
stall and surge could happen to booster, these kind of phenomena 
could result in engine vibration, which is enough to makes the crew 
uncomfortable.
Major
VBV 
position 
control
Shake
Acceleration
Deceleration
In both acceleration and deceleration process, VBV position shake 
could result in stable working margin of compress system decrease, 
switch between rotating speed limit control loop and other fuel control 
loops again and again. As a result, over rotating and thrust shake could 
happen. These kinds of phenomena could result in engine vibration, 
which is enough to makes the crew uncomfortable.
Major
7. Conclusion
Traditional FHA method is hard to use in VBV position control function failure hazard assessment, for 
not all engine effects are obviously. To solve this problem, this paper developed a method which 
introduces aero-engine dynamic model in the FHA process, then two groups of simulations were 
performed, simulation results indicate that:
• This model could identify engine effects of VBV position control function failure;
• Model analysis method of functional hazard for VBV position control function could ascertain engine 
effects hazard level by quantitative analysis, provides visual information for the assessment and could 
be a supplement for expert experience.
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